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Abstract. The growing cultural complexity in the face of new immigration waves 
influences the public understanding of religious diversity. The two central questions 
of this article are: ‘how much religious difference and of what kind is compatible 
within Europe?’ and secondly, ‘to what extent Muslim diversity can be integrated into 
Europe?’ This article makes an intervention in these questions and explores the extent 
to which discourses on religious diversity imply boundary making and aim at limiting 
religious freedom of Muslims. Empirically, I scrutinize press coverage between 2009 
and 2010, the years in which the minarets ban entered the socio-political arena of the 
European public debate. The methodology adopts a social network analysis to 
uncover semantic macro-structures and elicit common discourses in the press of 
France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Successively, discourse analysis of relevant 
samples is applied to examine textual strategies used to legitimate inclusion or 
exclusion of religious difference. 
Keywords: public debate, religion, diversity, integration, Islam, Muslim, media, press, 
discourse, method-mix, network analysis, semantics, critical discourse analysis, Italy, 
France, United Kingdom, Germany, Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
On 29 November 2009, the Swiss voted by a majority of 57.5 percent to 
add a provision to their Federal Constitution that bans the construction of new 
minarets (Moeckli, 2011: 774). Before the vote, only four minarets were 
present in the country and environmental legislation prohibited them from 
broadcasting a call to prayer (Lentin and Titley, 2012: 128). Nonetheless, 
according to the proponents of the referendum, the prohibition of minarets 
would preserve Switzerland’s cultural and political order (Fraudiger, 2008: 1).  
 
The campaign for the ban was conceived as a contentious issue designed to 
exploit anti-immigrant discontent and address the public presence of Islam in 
terms of fear, distrust and hostility (Lentin and Titley, 2012).  Despite 
criticism from the government and religious institutions in Switzerland, the 
outcome of the referendum was interpreted as a symptom of a general cultural 
and social insecurity of a large part of Swiss voters towards immigration 
(Mayer, 2011: 12), and above all, an expression of the problems of co-
existence between the Swiss majority and its Muslim minority (Christmann 
and Danaci, 2012: 154-155). 
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The vote sparked negative reactions throughout Europe, the ban was seen 
by cultural elites as deplorable sign of prejudice and intolerance towards a 
religious minority (Mayer, 2011: 12). At the same time, several political 
leaders questioned the actual merits of diversity rejecting ostentatious signs 
that political-religious Muslim groups want to impose (Scalvini, 2013: 11). 
However, both debates reveal that both the cultural and political elites are 
struggling to recognize the reality of an increasingly post-immigration Europe 
– where not only religious and cultural diversity play a much larger role than 
in the near-past, but it ignores the difference between those recently arrived 
migrants and those national citizens of immigrant origin. 
 
In recent years, there has been an intense public and policy debate about 
immigrant integration across Europe. Specifically, there is been a growing 
preoccupation with possible dangers to social cohesion represented by 
growing cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. However, many of these 
conflicts do not concern newcomers but descendants of immigrants, who are 
national citizens. Thus, my concern is to understand precisely for whom 
religious diversity is still such a problem today in Europe.  
 
This paper aims to bring a sense of clarity and coherence to what has 
become very complex shift in the reality of integration and offer some critical 
insights into the discourse of diversity. Hence, the two central questions of 
this article are: ‘how much religious difference and of what kind is compatible 
within Europe?’ and secondly, ‘to what extent Muslim diversity can be 
included into Europe?’ This article makes an intervention in these questions 
and explores the extent to which discourses on religious diversity imply 
boundary making and aim at limiting religious freedom of Muslims. 
 
I am convinced that this debate is an important example that reveals that 
not only is the recognition of diversity always under siege, but also that the 
fear of minorities continues to dominate the lexicon of the political debate. As 
Christopher Caldwell wrote to attack multicultural integration: “If you 
understand how immigration, Islam and native European culture interact in 
any Western European country, you can predict roughly how they will interact 
in any other” (Caldwell, 2009: 19). Consequently, this article is an account 
and an exploration of the limits and problems that relate to the respect for 
religious differences and how the rejection of these issues occurs.  
 
In the present study, I scrutinize press coverage between 2009 and 2010, 
the years in which the minarets ban entered the socio-political arena of the 
European public debate. The methodology adopts a social network analysis to 
uncover semantic macro-structures and elicit common discourses in the press 
of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Successively, discourse analysis of 
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relevant samples is applied to examine textual strategies used to legitimate 
inclusion or exclusion of religious difference. 
 
The article is organized in four sections. First, I give a general overview of 
the extent to which national narratives can constraint cultural pluralism. 
Second, I provide a review of the methodology, explaining the combination of 
network analysis with critical discourse analysis. Third, I present and discuss 
the similarity and variations in national press coverage. Fourth, I examine and 
explain the textual practices adopted to legitimate inclusion or exclusion. In 
conclusion, findings are summarized and some observations concerning the 
politics of religious diversity is offered. 
2. The National Constraints to a Post-Immigration Society 
The increased presence of Muslim provokes consequences for both the 
cultural and religious traditions of the nation. Veils at schools, ‘burqas’ in the 
streets, mosques in cities and minarets are the manifest visibility of Muslims’ 
religious diversity (Göle, 2002: 173). But why has has taken on a crucial role 
in public debates among other religions? Firstly, Muslims’ requests for 
political recognition of their religious diversity question an established sense 
of borders and loyalties to the cultural traditions and values of the Christian 
majority (Allievi, 2008; Croft, 2012). Secondly, Muslim immigrants confront 
European populations that are mainly secular and hence skeptical of religious 
arguments adopted in public (Cesari, 2004: 176). Islam is perceived as a non-
European religion and religious practice, which must be accommodated 
within pre-existing normative understandings and institutional arrangements 
between states and Christian churches (Bonjour and Lettinga, 2012: 261). In 
this national context, the past, the present and the future of national discourses 
are important ordering criteria of this public debate on Muslims. 
 
However, Muslims are now demanding religious and cultural rights as a 
consequence of their permanent settlement. Paradoxically, in this debate the 
question of religious diversity is based on a total misunderstanding of an 
increasingly post-migration society, where new identities struggle to be 
included within the cultural confines of national communities. This 
problematic is also reflected in the debate among intellectuals and scholars. 
For instance, in the media studies there is a large empirical literature, which 
demonstrates a persisting reproduction and often acceptance of negative social 
representations of Muslims across the media (Beker, 2006; Poole, 2002). But 
this literature does not dispose of an adequate conceptual range of instruments 
to grasp and understand the theoretical and conceptual problems concerning 
religious pluralism and citizenship. Overall, this problem is strongly present 
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in social sciences (cfr. Allievi, 2008), which still need to really come to terms 
with religion and its persistent and perhaps increased attention in social 
experience.  This aspect is crucial as the largest and most controversial 
debates concerning multiculturalism are about religious rights and not ethnic 
or linguistic diversity (Koopmans, 2013: 165) 
 
In political sciences, some important and insightful studies provided 
contributions from a theoretical perspective, several scholars argue that 
citizenship regulations and the understanding of nationhood strongly 
influence the relationship between majority and minority religious groups 
(Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998). Empirically, research investigated important 
aspects that make up and structure a public debate. For instance, Cinalli and 
Giugni (2013) examine the content of newspaper articles from 1999 to 2008, 
while van der Brug et al. (2015) focus upon ‘relevant events’ between 2001 
and 2009 to analyze political debates on Islam through broadsheets in seven 
Western European countries (cfr also Helbling, 2013). While these studies 
have provided an important theoretical and empirical contribution to identify 
explanatory variables, they do not offer a systematic study on the discursive 
strategies applied by the press, further they focus only on the debate related to 
Muslim immigrants and ignore the questions of how to deal with religious 
rules and customs of Muslim citizens such as descendants of immigrants. 
 
Linguistically, these discourses are articulated and conveyed in narratives 
on the origin, continuity, and transformation of the nation (Wodak et al, 
2009). Specifically, textual articulation defines who does and, crucially also, 
who does not belong to the national community. While, the political 
dimension of exclusion is explicit in discursive practice when the national 
Self is crystallized against an outer group. Therefore, I argue that also 
discourses of religious diversity might be conveyed in narratives reflecting 
established national constructions of citizenship. Islam representation is not 
only a stereotypical caricature of what is unfamiliar and excluded, but also an 
opposite in the sense of national self-categorization. As a consequence, the 
dispute over how much religious difference is acceptable points to the 
different traits and values that Muslims are seen to embody.   
 
This framework aims to investigate the ways in which discourses on 
religious diversity crosscut national narratives and function either to 
destabilize or provide avenues towards pluralism and citizenship. 
Accordingly, the next section provides a method to explore a large collection 
of text sources and to analyze them with the combination of network analysis 
and discourse analysis.  
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3. A Network Based Approach to Discourse Analysis 
The present study focuses upon the public debate on religious diversity in 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK in the aftermath of the Swiss referendum. 
The comparative approach has two dimensions. The first dimension concerns 
the extent to which the media of different countries draws on similar 
discourses. The second dimension focuses on the extent to which these 
discourses are inclusive or exclusionary.  
 
The study is also a demonstration of how network analysis can be 
incorporated as a methodology in qualitative content analysis. The interplay 
of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the network structure (Drieger, 
2013) of the debate supports the interpretation of the discursive practice. In 
this way, the corpus is explored using a social constructionist variant of 
network analysis, which can be described as a method for identifying, 
analyzing and reporting systematic patterns of text (Papacharissi and de 
Fatima Oliveira, 2008; Veltri, 2012). This method is particularly fruitful to 
explore macro-semantic structures (Van Dijk, 1980) in a deductive manner 
and maintaining a theoretical complexity to the empirical study of discourses 
(Drieger, 2013: 5). 
Data Collection 
I decided to rely only on quality newspapers because they are expected to 
cover political debate in a comprehensive way. The sample includes articles 
from The Telegraph (UK), The Guardian (UK), Corriere della Sera (IT), La 
Repubblica (IT), Le Figaro (FR), Le Monde (FR), Süddeutsche Zeitung (DE) 
and Die Welt (DE) as well as their Sunday editions. The Telegraph, Le Figaro 
and Die Welt have a conservative political orientation and have traditionally 
encouraged immigration restriction. Conversely, The Guardian, La 
Repubblica and Süddeutsche Zeitung have liberal/progressive political 
perspectives, and have largely been supportive of immigration and 
multicultural integration.  
 
Using Factiva, I conducted a search of broadsheet newspaper articles 
published in the aftermath of the referendum, namely in the period between 
29 November 2009 and 28 May 2010. The keywords ‘relig*’ and ‘diversity’ 
were used in the search. Thus, I included in the dataset those articles that 
mentioned both of these two terms. The search initially identified 277 
newspaper articles. The sample was pre-reviewed to identify those insightful 
articles and exclude those that made only passing reference to religious 
diversity. Finally, 192 articles were subsequently selected for an analysis of 
semantic networks and discourses. 
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Procedure of Analysis 
The goal of this semantic network analysis is to develop a taxonomy of 
concepts and their semantic relationships by combining syntactic and 
statistical information (Bordag, 2008). In doing so, I managed the datasets via 
an automated text mining Python script. The output for each country was 
stored into a CSV file. To avoid unnecessary noise, I excluded any meta-
textual information such as source, section, length, and author. I preserved 
only the text body, headline and the source. The corpus was then computed 
through word pairs and co-occurrences in a vector model space via Python 
syntactic/semantic libraries (Natural Language Toolkit and CLIPS/pattern). 
Consequently, I interpreted and classified adjacency pairs to avoid any 
semantic ambiguity. I also translated the non-English adjacency pairs in 
English and joined the four vectors by respecting word frequency and cosine 
similarity.  
 
I processed then the vector model to extract the network node coordinates 
through the Python NLT network module. I finally visualized and explored 
the map of the semantic relationships via Gephi an open source software for 
network analysis. The map allowed me to identify and compare the semantic 
associations through an algorithm for modularity classification. The outcome 
was then elicited to reveal latent discourses. In the last step of the analysis, I 
paid close attention to textual practice in a sample of texts, which reported a 
high index of association (I>0.6 and p<0.05) within the semantic clusters. 
This process of identification allowed me to sample representative segments 
of discourses and address a critical discourse analysis. 
 
An implicit limitation of this method is to explain only the characteristic 
large-scale statistical structures observed across press. There are certainly 
many aspects of semantic structure not captured in the network representation 
of a semantic model, for instance the ambiguity of meanings, the existence of 
different kinds of semantic relations, or the precise nature of the relations 
between word meanings and concepts in different languages. For this reason, 
the network semantic analysis is complemented by discourse analysis in order 
to develop a qualitative investigation of the textual strategies used within the 
press to legitimate inclusion or exclusion of religious difference. 
 
To summarize the above steps, the goal of the above methodology is to 
combine social network analysis and discourse analysis by computing the 
statistic distribution of semantic similarity. Successively, the semantic 
network is plotted to identify latent discourses and semantic relationships 
within clusters and countries. The outcome offers a better picture of the 
 8 
debate in terms of how discourses, held in different national public debate, are 
similar and complementary.  
4. Identifying the Discourses in the Debate 
In figure 1, I propose a two-layer network map where the grey nodes 
represent semantic groups or concepts defined by co-occurrences and 
similarity. The links in this conceptual layer denote the association between 
concepts (light gray) and countries (dark grey). The white nodes represent the 
layer of discourses, and the links with concepts and countries represent the 
semantic relationships that characterize the debate. This network map (Fig. 1) 
suggests that three major discourses have been disseminated to the readership 
in the aftermath of the Swiss referendum. These discourses can be 
summarized in the following way:  
 
1. The liberal discourse promotes diversity of values, beliefs and identities 
(nodes: ‘respect’, ‘rights’, ‘multiculturalism’). This discourse is strongly 
committed to the nodes of ‘participation’ and ‘responsibility’. This link 
reveals an idea of society based on ‘solidarity’ and ‘respect’ of 
ethnic/religious communities. Hence, this discourse implies ‘recognition’ and 
‘tolerance’ of religious diversity through the universal values of reason and 
tolerance. However, the node codified as ‘universalism’ can be polysemic. 
Here universalism might refer to a kind of universal pluralism in which 
prevails the idea of a cosmopolitan society but it could also define a 
normative horizon of integration, which find in liberal norms and values the 
universal and superior bonds of society. As a consequence, this ambiguity can 
imply a low ‘tolerance’ for those Islamic practices perceived as illiberal.  
 
2. The nationalist discourse points to the national community (nodes: unity, 
continuity, history, nation, polity). Co-existence with Islam is possible and 
negotiable, so long as a communitarian identity does not prevail. In this 
discourse, there is a close relationship between the core node and the concepts 
of ‘history’, ‘nation’, ‘unity’, which provide the main assumptions about the 
national culture (nodes ‘traditions’, ‘continuity’, ‘heritage’). Hence, this 
discourse requires Muslims to assimilate to the particular cultural and political 
characteristics of the national community in order to preserve its ‘continuity’ 
and ‘unity’. 
 
3. The exclusionist discourse assumes that Islam and Muslim culture are 
‘illiberal’ and based on a ‘radical’ interpretation of religion. Muslim social 
and political institutions are thus regarded as opposed to ‘Western’ 
civilization and Islam is considered an undesirable religion. Therefore, in this 
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discourse can de distinguished by an ethnocentric vision and a supposed 
‘superiority’ of Western culture. It should be noted that this discourse not 
necessarily embraces conservatism but also liberal philosophies. Intriguingly 
the map (fig. 1) reveals two links between the core node and ‘feminism’ and 
‘gay’. Presumably, these discourses are conveyed via inter-discursivity to 
depict Islam as misogynist and patriarchal.  
 
 
Figure 1 : Semantic Network of the Debate 
A cross-national comparison of the country-nodes suggests the presence of 
specific national patterns. For instance, the French node is closer to the 
nationalist discourse and prioritizes ‘secularism’, ‘republicanism’ and ‘values’ 
nodes. The French debate also reflects a significant degree of connection to 
the exclusionist discourse through the nodes of ‘identity’ and 
‘communitarism’. Instead, the German node is close to the exclusionist 
discourse, though the link through the concept of ‘intolerance’ might be read 
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as a concern for racism. Germany is also linked to the pluralist discourse 
through ‘religion’ and to the nationalist discourse via the ‘identity’ node. The 
position of the Italian node reflects the polarization of the Italian debate 
between the exclusionist discourse (connecting nodes: expulsion, immigrants) 
and the pluralist discourse (nodes: respect and solidarity). The British node is 
connected to both the pluralist discourse through the ‘community’ node and 
the nationalist discourse through ‘loyalty’. 
 
These national patterns seem to be highly interconnected with established 
discourses on the nation. Briefly, in France any forms of communitarism 
based on ethnic, linguistic or religious identities are contrasted by Republican 
and Secular discourses (Jennings, 2000). In Germany, public debate avoids 
any references in negative terms of religious diversity because of the legacy of 
racist aberrations under Nazism. However, after reunification, a concern for 
the Leitkultur [the German leading culture] discourse seems to orient the 
present debate on immigration (Stehle, 2012: 168). In Italy, Catholic 
organizations and Unions have promoted the recognition of cultural pluralism, 
which has been favored by the lack of nationalistic discourses in the post-
WWII public debate, however at the local level, forces like the Lega Nord 
have pursued a radical anti-Islamic agenda polarizing the public debate 
(Scalvini, 2011). In the UK, the experience of a “multiracial empire”  
(Hansen, 2000: viii) gives importance to minority groups by offering “social 
and political influence to members of ethno-cultural minorities” (Bertossi, 
2007: 4). Therefore, inter-discursivity could explain the national patterns 
identified in Figure 1.  
 
This realization, however, leads just to a partial understanding of how 
established discourses at the national scale operate to legitimate or 
delegitimize religious diversity. The semantic network in Figure 1 does not 
map onto the different newspapers, their partisan commitments, and therefore 
how their discursive strategies relate to traditional right-left political debates 
in these countries. Therefore, I quantified the ways that newspapers orientate 
towards each discursive strategy. The outcome in Figure 2 shows that the 
there is a correlation between newspaper political orientation and adopted 
discursive strategy, the center-left press is more inclined to draws on a liberal-
pluralist discourse while the center-right press has a higher prevalence of 
semantic association with the exclusionist discourse. However, in Figure 3 it 
can been seen that the associations related to the nationalist discourse have 
almost an equivalent distribution between the two political stances. For this 
reason, it is necessary a more detailed exploration of these semantic 
associations and their correlation to the political spectrum. 
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specific partisan commitment. The edges represent connectivity between 
nodes, a higher connectivity among nodes related to conservative press 
reveals a predominance in public debate. This leadership is indirectly 
confirmed by intertextuality, the nodes of the progressive press are very often 
linked to nodes of the opposite side. This particular configuration of edges 
shows that conservative press shapes the public debate, while the progressive 
side mainly reacts to arguments and discourses coming from the center-right 
broadsheets.  
 
A closer analysis of nodes suggests that conservative press (top nodes) 
focuses on ‘Islam’ as different ‘culture’ and ‘religion.’ Such ‘diversity’ is 
opposed to a specific identity, which belongs to ‘Christianity’, ‘Europe’, and 
the ‘West’. This connotation of the European identity is characterized by 
‘national values’, ‘faith’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘reason’, while ‘Mosque’ or ‘Imam’ 
are regarded as a ‘problem’ or a source of ‘conflict’, ‘tension’, ‘violence’ and 
‘fear’. Therefore, the debate within the conservative press tends to have 
distinct elements of both the exclusionist and nationalist discourses. On the 
other hand, a substantial part of this debate draws also on nodes like 
‘dialogue’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’, which relate to a liberal/pluralist 
discourse. 
 
As showed in Figure 3, the Semantic Map (Fig. 4) confirms that 
progressive broadsheets (bottom area) are more committed towards a 
liberal/pluralist discourse. The main nodes ‘Muslims’, ‘community’, ‘social’ 
reveal that the coverage is more about social cohesion rather than visible 
aspects of diversity like culture and religious identity. Specifically, 
‘immigration’ and ‘policy’, ‘participation’, play a substantial role in setting he 
goals of the process of integration of Muslims. However, some nodes like 
‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘gay’ reveal some of the ambiguity within the 
liberal/pluralist discourse because it identifies Islam as misogynist and 
patriarchal, therefore Muslims need to be educated to the liberal norms and 
values the universal and superior bonds of our progressive society. This 
aspect can be also declined as an exclusionist discourse when radically 
patronizes Muslim women and imposes a ban to the headscarf. The 
overlapping area (light-grey nodes) mirrors the concepts of the nationalist 
discourse, ‘government’, ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘citizen’ are the major concepts 
defining the national political community. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 
 
The o
boundary
referend
Three co
discours
renounci
Debate 
exclusiv
commun
discours
through 
exclusio
 
4 - Political Po
utcome of 
 of the deb
um by anal
mmon disc
e is inclus
ng the divis
becomes m
ist discourse
ity, where I
e presuppos
a common 
nary discour
larization 
the present 
ate on relig
yzing the p
ourses have
ive and pr
iveness caus
ore conflic
s. They exp
slam and M
es homogen
identity an
se aims to li
network se
ious diversit
ress covera
 been ident
esupposes 
ed by forms
tual when 
ress a highly
uslim cultur
eity and se
d related v
mit or exclu
mantic anal
y in the afte
ge of four 
ified in Fig
that diversi
 of national
we enter 
 national co
e are questi
eks to main
alues and 
de Muslim r
ysis has def
rwards of t
European c
ure 1. The 
ty can be 
 identity and
the nationa
nception of
oned. The n
tain social 
beliefs, whe
eligious dive
13 
 
ined the 
he Swiss 
ountries. 
pluralist 
realized 
 loyalty. 
list and 
 political 
ationalist 
cohesion 
reas the 
rsity.  
 14 
This realization, however, leads just to a partial understanding of how 
established discourses at the national scale operate to legitimate or 
delegitimize religious diversity. The semantic network in Figure 4 focuses on 
newspaper partisan commitments, and therefore how their discursive 
strategies relate to traditional right-left political debates. Conservative press 
expresses preoccupation about the raising cultural and religious diversity 
setting factual and symbolic limits to national membership and cultural 
belonging. On the other hand, progressive broadsheets are more concentrated 
in promoting social cohesion and pursuing the join golas of inclusion and 
integration. However, the semantic map have also identified overlapping 
nodes and intra-connected edges that reflect both the degree of intertextuality 
and interdiscoursivity of the press coverage.  
5. Discourse Legitimation and Textual Practice 
This level of analysis is aimed at analyzing the textual strategies adopted to 
legitimate inclusion or exclusion in the discourses on religious diversity. In 
order to assess the textual strategy, I focused on 1) the argumentative features 
of the text; and 2) the lexical units and syntactic devices employed in the 
presentation of self and other (Wodak et al., 2009). For reason of feasibility, I 
selected the most representative excerpts within the sample. 
The Liberal-Pluralist Discursive Strategy 
The pluralist discourse emphasizes the moral responsibility of the national 
polity to include other religious traditions. This discourse is strongly 
committed to participation and gives highly importance to the topoi of culture 
and history. In the sample is possible to identify a vocabulary evoking 
Europe’s tradition of tolerance and reason and the related principles of 
coexistence between different religious groups. The topos of history aims 
linguistically to create a context of continuity throughout the history of 
Europe. Here, continuity refers to linking history to a common political 
present and future (Wodak et al., 2009: 30) by establishing chronological and 
causal relations with the past. In the following excerpt, this strategy can be 
observed:  
 
Excerpt 1  
 “The European tolerance was .. a mode of coexistence between Catholics and Protestants, 
later Jews. Only in a second step, freedoms and public use of reason developed from the 
religious tolerance became the basis of modern constitutional states. Our democratic 
freedoms derived directly from the freedom of religion” [SDDZ, 12 December 2009] 
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Here the historical dimension of Europe is evoked through parallelism 
between religious wars and the present, hence tolerance, coexistence and 
reason, which underpin the democratic values of modern Europe originated by 
the religious freedom. In Excerpt 2, the topos of culture is used to remind 
readers that tolerance is always under attack; therefore, it is a moral 
imperative to use the universal reason to maintain this cultural inheritance: 
 
Excerpt 2 
 “a common challenge is fostering tolerance and religious freedom everywhere”  
“we must confront the cultural roots, using common elements as the reason and the logos” 
(IT: Corriere della Sera, 30 November 2009) 
 
Excerpt 2 repeats the adjective ‘common’ in order to accentuate unifying 
shared features such as ‘reason’ and ‘logos’. The topos of culture responds to 
the necessity to accentuate cohesion; on the other hand, it implies a one-sided 
European heritage, which is assigned entirely positive attributes from the 
values of the Enlightenment, and systematically excludes intolerance and 
totalitarianism from this selective narrative.  
 
In excerpt 2 and 3, the topos of culture is also elaborated through the 
deictic personal pronoun ‘we’ is the form of ‘person for country’ is also a 
metonymic form of ‘we’. Specifically, in excerpt 3, the personal pronoun ‘we’ 
and the possessive adjective ‘our’ refers to the ‘national body’, those elements 
are the linguistic devices defining the in-group: 
 
Excerpt 3 
We need not only to identify our values, and to live by them, but also to acknowledge the 
basis for them. (UK: The Telegraph, 27 December 2009) 
 
The synecdoche reference to the ‘we’-group is frequently linked to the 
‘they’-group. The opposition ‘we/them’ reflects linguistically an ambiguous 
asymmetrical relationship because it expresses a hierarchy: ‘we’ is the subject 
and ‘them’ is the complement. In this way, personification of the groups is 
used to invite to cohesiveness, readers are addressed as a united and cohesive 
group sharing the same values. But it also implies two separate groups with 
different set of values. For this reason, Muslims [‘them’] are solicited to 
reflect upon their values and support these values even when they find 
themselves opposed to their religious or cultural identity (Esposito and Kalin, 
2011: 7). This strategy is evident in Excerpt 4: 
 
Excerpt 4 
Muslims in Europe should be proud of our identity that is enriched by the universal values 
of our religion. (FR: Le Monde, 5 December 2009) 
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This excerpt articulates the wish that Muslims ‘should’ recognize themselves 
as European; the modal expression ‘should’ indicates an obligation rather than 
a choice (Costelloe, 2014: 325). The modal signals that the whole 
argumentation is conjectural. Rather than being grounded on factual 
observations, the argument is supported by a verb expressing a feeling of what 
is due to the in-group. In this way, the out-group is called to express its pride 
for supporting the in-group’s culture. In this way, the immediate equality 
between the two cultures appears highly improbable. This specific excerpt 
reveals how “universal” present a polysemic ambiguity. In the liberal-pluralist 
discourse, universal should refer to a kind of pluralism in which prevails the 
idea of a cosmopolitan society. Instead, universal in Excerpt 4 defines a 
normative limit to pluralism, which find in liberal norms and values the 
superior bonds of society. 
 
A very distinctive feature of the pluralist discourse is the ‘paternalistic we,’ 
the synecdochal pronoun ‘we’ is adopted to be speaker-inclusive, but which 
actually excludes the speaker (Wodak et al., 2009: 46) and refers solely to a 
moral aspiration to universalism, which emanates from the supposed 
uniqueness culture of the majority group. In excerpt 5, ‘we’ is also supported 
by the imperative modal verb ‘must’, as a consequence the ‘we’-group 
patronize education to develop critical thinking in the out-group through a 
topos of advantage (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005: 226) which is in the form of a 
pro bono publico (for the public good) and in the form of a pro vitis eorum 
(for the benefit of Muslim fellows): 
 
Excerpt 5 
We must make every effort to ensure that this education enables new generations to have an 
understanding of Islam that ensures their balance and social development, education that 
enables them to have a critical look at all the traditions and customs that are aggregated to 
Islam and who, in addition to it being foreign, often constitute negations. (FR: Le Monde, 5 
December 2009) 
 
In excerpt 5 there is a two-fold usage of the modal, a deontic construction 
combining the understanding of what is Islam (modal base) with education 
about what is preferable (ordering source), and an epistemic modality 
combining knowledge about what the in-group is committed to (modal base) 
with the liberal culture that the in-group considers more or less ignored in the 
out-group (ordering source). This construction reflects the ambiguity of the 
polysemic nature of the ‘universalism’ node (fig. 1). In excerpt 5, the use of 
the modal encodes a patronizing strategy, which determines who can and who 
cannot judge a particular form of diversity fits in a universal category, in turn, 
this power reproduces a hierarchy of acceptable and unacceptable cultures. 
 
 17 
The authority to name and categorize groups reflect also the ability to 
categorise the subject [‘we’] as the “legitimator” of the group membership 
and accordingly the authority to disregard the out-group. In doing so, the the 
subject has the role to define and elaborate the categories of social 
membership (Costelloe, 2014: 333). However, in excerpt 6 it can be identified 
a different linguistic device: the generalizing ‘we’ synecdoche pars pro toto. 
In other words, a secular sub-group is called to represents the entirety of 
Muslims. In the following extract, the use the personal pronoun ‘we’ 
simultaneously position the Muslim out-group as being member of both the 
in-group: 
 
Excerpt 6              
We, republican Muslims and hence secular, as French citizens we love France not by 
chance. We like France because it is a humanistic democracy, reason why Muslims joined 
the army to make the ultimate sacrifice. We also love France because women can fight for 
their rights. And of course, we like secularism because it allows everyone to believe in what 
they want, or not to believe. We admire the 1905 law separating state and faith so that no 
one can ever decide what view is superior to another one.  (FR: Le Figaro, 22 December 
2009)  
 
A self-declared group of ‘republican Muslims’ published this text in the 
conservative newspaper Le Figaro. Here, the deictic reference to the pronoun 
‘we’ express the self-identification of the authors with the values of the 
French republic. The pronoun ‘we’ also becomes a particular icon standing for 
a complete set of characteristics expected from the in-group to consider 
Muslims properly recognized as French. Additionally, the repetition of the 
personal pronoun ‘we’ reinforces the presumption of shared values and 
emphasizes the adherence to the national identity. Repetition also indicates an 
‘intensifying’ strategy which is used to provoke emotivism.  
 
In excerpt 6 different tropes are used more or less explicitly to construct 
sameness within both groups. However, the most intriguing and worrying 
aspect of this interplay between groups reminds Fanon’s analysis in Peau 
noire, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks, 1952) about the feeling of 
dependency and inadequacy that the colonized experience in the colonizers’ 
world. Therefore, a critical aspect of the analysis of the liberal discourse 
should point to differences with the European Civilizing mission embedded in 
colonialism.  
 
Overall, the liberal pluralist discourse is driven by an attempt to include 
Muslims and Islam in Europe, linguistically this goal is created through a 
constructive strategy linked primarily to topoi of a shared past and a collective 
present and future. At the same time, this discourse also asks for and expects 
from Muslims to demonstrate their willingness to integration. 
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The Nationalistic Discoursive Strategy 
This discourse is characterized by a lexicon that invokes an in-group status 
of superiority than can be considered as archetypal forms of “self- 
glorification” and “self-presentation” (van Dijk, 2006: 370). National 
identification aims at preserving a continuity principle of accepted and 
internalized social representations of the ethno-national in-group’s worldview 
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2005: 226). As a consequence, dissimilarity or variation 
is perceived as undesirable. For illustrating this discourse, I chose Nikolas 
Sarkozy’s editorial, published on 8 December in both Le Monde and the 
Guardian (two progressive newspapers), because shifts of ‘we’-position, 
generalizing-synecdochal and metonymic references are explicative and 
suggestive.  
 
In this editorial, the former French President defends the Swiss vote, 
because it does not discriminate against the freedoms of religious practice or 
conscience. According to Sarkozy, it is understandable for European people to 
worry about their national identity and demand that Muslims accept the 
historical values of the nation-states where they now live. Therefore, 
according to Sarkozy, Muslims are newcomers not included within the 
political borders of the national membership and cultural belonging. Muslim 
religious diversity is seen as in conflict with the funding elements of the 
French republic, thus this nationalist discourse completely ignores the rights 
of those who are national citizens such as descendants of immigrants or those 
converted to Islam.  
 
Sarkozy’s main argument is based on national continuity (Wodak et al, 
2009: 40) through a topos of identity. People are described as afraid of 
loosing their identity (line 30). For example, Sarkozy advocates that people’s 
fear cannot be ignored or undervalued (lines: 31-32). In his view, the Swiss 
people felt their identity was being threatened by immigration (lines 32-33). 
As a consequence, Sarkozy argues that the rights of religious minorities do 
not and must not override or change the secular identity that the national 
majority accepts culturally. Therefore, according to Sarkozy religious 
minorities such as Muslims are not national and might menace the identity of 
nationals. 
 
A further strategy adopted by Sarkozy is to focus Muslim’s responsibilities 
towards the ‘we’-group. In line 35, “national identity” reflects the value of 
nationalism as a secular characterisation of both self-determination and 
respect of the individual and personality. While the metonymic use of 
“tribalism” and “sectarianism” is associated to Muslim communities. 
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Tactically, these metonymies are opposed to the ‘we’-group. In line 49, “our 
country” is a metonymy adopted to linguistically represent nationals.  
 
Excerpt 7 
[49] But I also want to tell them that in our country, where Christian 
[50] civilisation has left a lasting mark, where republican values are part of 
[51] our national identity, anything that could be regarded as a challenge to 
[52] those values would scupper the creation of the kind of French Islam that, 
[53] without undermining any of its core beliefs, shares our social and civic 
[54] contract. 
 
Successively, he also refers to “our national identity,” and explicitly 
remarks that these metonymies are denoted by Christian heritage and 
republican values (lines 49-50).  However, this construction is not exclusive, 
according to Sarkozy, Muslims are responsible of political belonging, and of 
the creation of a French version of Islam. Here there are similarities with 
excerpt 5 on “Republican Muslims.”  Muslims have thus the moral obligation 
to recognise and accept “our [French] social and civic contract” (lines 53-54). 
In other words, Muslims must respect the rules of French society without 
asking for any special accommodation. The goal is to assimilate Muslims in 
the political and cultural roots of France and create a “French Islam” (line 53).   
 
Excerpt 8 
[55]  Whatever our beliefs, we must avoid provoking others and must realise   
[56]  how lucky we are to inhabit a free country. We must practice religion   
[57]  discreetly – not through any lack of faith, but out of fraternal respect   
[58]  for those whose beliefs we do not share, but with whom we want to live.  
  
It is worth noting the we-reference shift in this editorial. In excerpt 7, 
Sarkozy does not address directly Muslims: “I want also to tell them that in 
our country” (line 49); rather, he is ‘telling’ to the French people about 
Muslims. In excerpt 8, Sarkozy conveys the synecdochal speaker-inclusive 
‘we’ to include Muslims in the ‘we’-group. But this shift is also characterised 
by a normative modal construction, he repeats ‘We must’ three times between 
line 55-54. This linguistic device is not just a rhetorical strategy but it reveals 
a context of tutelage, the verb must introduce specific normative directives: 
“we must”… “avoid”, “realise”, and “practice”. In doing so, Sarkozy adopts a 
‘paternalistic we.’ This synecdochal ‘we’ in excerpt 8 excludes the speaker 
and refers solely to “Muslims”.  
 
Overall, the main stake of this discourse pursues assimilation of Muslims 
rather than integration. Consequently, Muslims must change or adapt to 
become integrated in the nation. For understanding this discursive strategy, a 
sense of national continuity is crucial because it is thornily linked up with the 
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question of national identity, and which values are necessary to define 
political membership. However, this discourse perpetuates a wrong 
assumption, namely Muslims can become citizens only if they renounce to the 
conflictual aspects of their cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. But many 
of these conflicts do not concern newcomers but descendants of immigrants, 
who are national citizens. 
 
The Exclusionist Discursive Strategy 
This discourse emphasizes Islam as incompatible with Western and 
European values, it presupposes the impossibility to assimilate Muslims. As a 
consequence, Muslim social and political institutions are regarded illegitimate 
and religious diversity is represented as an issue threatening social cohesion. 
This disocurse of exclusion is linguistically based on several textual 
strategies. Extraxt 9 emphasis a sense of loss, which is expressed primarily 
through a topos of culture: 
 
Excerpt 9 
The broader problem is that there has been the loss of a common narrative, a story which 
underpins our national life. In the past, this was provided by the Judaeo-Christian tradition, 
derived from the Bible. (UK: The Telegraph, 27 December 2009) 
 
The source of national life is set back to the Judeo-Christian traditions 
provided by the Bible, but this culture is perceived as lost. These specific 
traditions play a role in defining who belongs to the national polity, at the 
same time the antithetical narrative can be used to exclude Muslims. It is 
interesting to observe the different use of this topos made in the pluralist 
discourse, creating a sense of continuity with the present to seek similarity. In 
the present discourse, the loss of a common narrative is an attempt to dismiss 
religoius diversity.  Excerpt 10 explicitely claims that religious diversity is a 
cause of disruption which brings confusion and moral disorder:  
 
Excerpt 10 
What a miasma of moral confusion we are succumbing to - all for the sake of avoiding a 
question that must be asked: how does a liberal society cope with a minority in whose name 
acts of violence are carried out in its midst? (UK: Sunday Telegraph, 29 November 2009) 
 
In Excerpt 10, “miasma” is used metonymically to describe the uncertenty 
of the present. In the second sentence of the sample, the esclusionist argument 
is introduced by a rhetorical question, while the synecdochal reference to the 
minority out-group is linked with derogatory attributions and ascriptions of 
negative features such as violence. 
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The radicalism of this discourse is explicit in an editorial entitled “New 
Rules for Immigration” written in the Corriere della Sera by Giovanni 
Sartori, a well known political theorist and emeritus professor at Columbia 
University. The editorial predicts a negative future for Italy and Europe 
because Islam is incompatible with Western societies. In excerpt 11.1, an 
anecdotal fallacy based on historical and geographical topos is adopted to 
justify and make immutable ethnical and political differences: 
 
Excerpt 11.1 
The question then is if you tell us the story of cases, from 630 d.C. onwards, integration of 
Muslims, or at least of their successful incorporation of ethical and political (in the values of 
the political system), in non-Islamic societies. The answer is depressing: no (IT: Corriere 
della Sera, 20 December 2009). 
 
Sartori persists in this strategy of discrediting Islam through trivialization 
by means of personalization and metonymization. In excerpt 11.2, it can be 
found a derogatory attribution of “invasive” and a negatively connoted 
metaphor of “inflaming”: 
 
Excerpt 11.2 
Islam is … an invasive theocratic monotheism that after a long stagnation has awakened and 
is increasingly inflaming. (IT: Corriere della Sera, 20 December 2009). 
 
Further, Sartori emphasizes a topos of comparison (locus minoris) with 
other immigrant groups: 
 
Excerpt 11.3 
Chinese, Japanese, and Indians are integrated without problems in the West while 
maintaining their respective cultural and religious identities. (IT: Corriere della Sera, 20 
December 2009). 
 
In excerpt 11.3, it is interesting to observe the depersonalization of 
immigrants by national categories to erase religious differences and the use of 
the passive which implies their lack of agency in the process of integration. 
Sartori commits also a fallacy in this comparison, he mixes up national and 
religious identities, as a large part of Indian are Muslim then his argument is 
fallacious.  
 
Muslims are depicted as a minority representing an explicit threat: “The 
illusion to integrate Muslims is a giant risk to avoid, a risk not to risk it”. The 
word ‘risk’ is repeated three times in order to give more emotional emphasis 
to the threat. The consequence is that “Muslims should not be able to become 
Italian citizens.” But the the validity of the argument is independent of the 
truth or falsity of the premise, then Sartori commits a new logical fallacy. In 
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fact, several Muslims are Italians because they converted to Islam, or have 
obtained citizenship through naturalisation.  
 
Additionally, this argument is expressed through a normative-deontic 
modal “should not be able”. The use of the passive tense denotes a lack of 
agency but it is interesting to identify the hidden agent: ‘by us’ . Thus this 
sentence could be rephrased as ‘We should not let Muslims to become Italian 
citizens.’  The representation of Muslim newcomers as a threat implicitly 
activates an exclusionary discourse, which aims justifying and legitimizing 
expulsion or strong regulation of minority rights. This discourse of exclusion 
becomes highly problematic when diversity is considered non-negotiable or 
very dependent on the traditions marking the in-group.  
 
In large part of this debate, there is no attempt to neglect Muslims and their 
religious freedom. In the liberal discourse, I have found explicit emphasis of 
similarity and sameness as well as emphasis of integration and social 
cohesion.  Whereas I have classified an assimilative emphasis in the 
nationalist discourse, which stresses differences and accentuates identity to 
preserve the continuity of shared values and beliefs. The last discourse is 
characterized by an exclusionary emphasis, in which differences are pointed 
out as a threat when incompatible with the dominant values, norms, and 
beliefs of a society. Therefore, nationalist and exclusionary discourses imply a 
regulation of the processes of integration through a limitation, or at least 
diminution, of religious diversity.  
6. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to analyse the discourses related to the intense 
public and policy debate about Muslim integration across Europe. 
Specifically, voters as well as politicians are expressing a growing 
preoccupation with possible dangers that growing cultural, religious and 
ethnic diversity represent for national unity and social cohesion. For this 
reason, I explored press coverage between 2009 and 2010, the years in which 
the minarets ban entered the socio-political arena of the European public 
debate. The main goal of the methodology was to understand how religious 
diversity was problematized through a social network analysis, which allowed 
me to uncover semantic associations and elicit common discourses in the 
press of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Successively, I applied 
discourse analysis to relevant samples in order to examine textual strategies 
used to legitimate inclusion or exclusion of religious difference. 
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The most substantial finding confirms an alignment of news coverage 
within the four countries. Three common discourses with different degrees of 
tolerance have been identified: 1) Liberal-Pluralist; 2) Nationalist; 3) 
Exclusionist. However, the comparison suggests that at the national level 
these discourses prioritize specific patterns, which reflect both the particular 
history of each country and the partisan commitment of the press. This finding 
is also confirmed by inter-discoursivity, which provides an effective analytical 
tool to assess the ways in which discourses crosscut established national 
narratives and function either to destabilize or provide avenues towards 
pluralism. Further, at the intertextual level the network semantic map revealed 
that conservative press had a role of leadership in this debate, while 
progressive broadsheets mainly reacted to arguments and discourses coming 
from the opposite political side. 
 
Discourse analysis investigated the textual devices and linguistic strategies 
employed in the representation of pluralism and tolerance through discursive 
practice. In the pluralist discourse diversity is posed in terms of similarity and 
sameness as well as inclusion. At the same time, the emphasis on social 
cohesion sets out an expectation from Muslims to demonstrate their 
willingness to integration. In the nationalist discourse the question is more 
about the degrees of diversity that can be integrated into the national 
community, the implicit limits of tolerance symbolize the boundary of the 
national polity. While in the exclusionary discourse, national identity and 
difference are assumed to be binary constructions. In this construction, 
diversity can be interpreted as a threat when incompatible with the dominant 
values, norms, and beliefs of the majority. Although these three discourses are 
somewhat different, they relate as they concern about Muslim religious 
diversity as a kind of difference that might jeopardize social bonds.  
 
Paradoxically, in this debate the question of religious diversity is based on 
a total misunderstanding of an increasingly post-migration society, where new 
identities struggle to be included within the cultural confines of national 
communities. The explored discourses perpetuate a wrong assumption, 
namely Muslims are no included in the perimeter of the national community, 
they can become citizens only if they renounce to the conflictual aspects of 
their cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. But many of these conflicts, as 
the recent shootings in Paris and Brussels prove, do not concern newcomers 
but descendants of immigrants, who are national citizens. 
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Addendum 
 
Table 1 – Composition of the Dataset 
 
 France UK Germany Italy Total 
Articles 54 46 38 49 187 
Words 39,877 54,760 57,078 30,907 191,592 
% 20.8 29.98 31.24 16.92 100 
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